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Abstract
This paper argues that central bankers should raise inflation when anticipating
liquidity traps to signal their credibility to forward guidance policies. As stable
inflation in normal times either stems from central banker’s credibility, e.g. through
reputation, or from his aversion to inflation, the private sector is unable to infer
the central banker’s type from observing stable inflation, jeopardizing the efficiency
of forward guidance policy. We show that this signaling motive can justify level of
inflation well above 2% but also that the low inflation volatility during the Great
Moderation was insufficient to ensure fully efficient forward guidance when needed.
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1 Introduction
Optimal monetary policy often requires to manipulate private agents expectations,
potentially leading to time-inconsistent policies, as the central banker may find desirable
to renege on past promises. As a solution, Rogoff (1985) advocated for delegating mon-
etary policy to an independent and inflation averse central banker (e.g. with a unique
objective of price stability) so as to ensure a credible stabilization of inflation. This
partially explains why many central banks have adopted a clear price stability mandate.
However, such a delegation to an inflation-averse central banker falls short of opti-
mally stabilizing the economy in the presence of a liquidity trap, that results from the
zero lower bound (ZLB, thereafter) on nominal interest rates.1 In this case, the central
banker can still stimulate the economy by promising to generate an inflationary boom
after the deflationary shock disappears - the so-called forward guidance (see Eggertsson
and Woodford, 2003; Werning, 2012). Yet, such an inflationary boom is unlikely to be
engineered by an inflation-averse central banker, thus jeopardizing the efficiency of for-
ward guidance.2 And so, we need to find conditions under which a central banker is
also credible to deviate from inflation stabilization after liquidity traps and to convince
private agents of such a credibility once the liquidity trap occurs.
In this paper, we provide a theory of why forward guidance may be more or less efficient
depending on the central banker’s objectives and his past behavior in terms of responses
to shocks and the inflation rate. To this purpose, we study optimal monetary policy
when private agents are uncertain about the central banker’s preferences that determine
his credibility to implement an inflationary boom after a liquidity trap. More specifically,
we link central banker’s preference to the sustainability of the Ramsey outcome through
the threat of reversion to the discretionary outcome. We determine whether standard
monetary policy instruments can be used as a signal to ensure credibility and, hence,
the efficiency of forward guidance. Our main result is that raising inflation before a
liquidity trap occurs can achieve such a signaling so that private agents anticipate a
forward guidance policy once the economy actually falls into a liquidity trap. Turning to
historical data, we show that the low inflation volatility during the Great Moderation was
insufficient to generate such signaling and to ensure the efficiency of forward guidance
once in a liquidity trap as observed during the Great Recession.
But why signal through higher inflation? Recall that a forward guidance policy is
least likely to be followed through by inflation-averse central bankers. And so, a credible
1The lower bound on nominal interest rates may be slightly below zero as we have already observed
slightly negative rates in Switzerland or in the euro area.
2This echoes the so-called “forward guidance puzzle” documented by Del Negro et al. (2013) and
McKay et al. (2015) among others.
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central banker has every incentive to be distinguished from such conservative central
bankers. And because conservative central bankers are inclined to stabilize inflation in
normal times, increasing inflation is the only available tool so as to ensure credibility
before a liquidity trap occurs.
To formalize that argument, we consider a new Keynesian model facing a period of
negative natural interest rate that pushes the economy into a liquidity trap. Section
2 presents the model under perfect information and proves that an intermediate but
positive weight on the output gap stabilization objective in central banker’s preferences
is necessary to sustain the Ramsey allocation when introducing reputation concerns.
However, such a central banker will conduct a policy that is similar to the one conducted
by the conservative central banker in normal times. We then introduce asymmetric
information on the weight of the output gap stabilization objective and limit the central
banker’s types to two: either he maximizes social welfare (the benevolent central banker)
or he only takes inflation into account in his objective function (the conservative central
banker) and therefore is not able to sustain forward guidance in the benchmark model.
Our main insight (Section 3) is that inflation before the liquidity trap occurs can
be used as a signaling device for the benevolent central banker. First, signaling is not
possible during a liquidity trap as the policy instrument is constraint by the zero lower
bound. Thus, if signaling is optimal, it must take place prior to the liquidity trap.
Second, as inflation is the only variable entering into the conservative central banker’s
objective function, it is also the only means to distinguish between the benevolent central
banker and the conservative one as the latter will not be inclined to mimic the former.
The benevolent central banker then optimally sets inflation at the rate at which the
conservative central banker would be indifferent between mimicking the benevolent central
banker and adopting a conservative monetary policy. This inflation rate increases with
the probability, the intensity and the length of liquidity traps.
Furthermore, signaling is possible only if the benevolent central banker weights output
gap stabilization in his objective and has some inflation bias. Even though this inflation
bias does not affect the equilibrium outcome, it makes inflation relatively less costly for
him than for the conservative central banker.3 This also means that forward guidance
can be credible only when the central banker has an objective of output gap stabilization
and not only an objective of inflation stabilization.
Turning to quantification (Section 4), the required inflation level is significantly higher
than 0. When calibrating our model, we show that this signaling motive can generate
a level of inflation of around 2%. In addition, we observe that even a small increase
3In other words, the inflation bias in benevolent central bankers’ preferences plays the role of a
Spence-Mirrlees condition in the signaling problem.
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in the probability or the expected length of the liquidity trap can increase the level of
signaling inflation to above 3%. Note that, in our framework, inflation does not reduce
the probability of a liquidity trap and does not help to reduce the consequences of this
liquidity trap, so that these values only reflect our signaling motive. In particular, this
explains why we find different values compared with Coibion et al. (2012) who consider
the buffer motive of raising inflation.
But how costly is signaling? To investigate further this issue, we consider three
possible extensions of our benchmark model that may affect either the benevolent or
the conservative central banker’s incentives: the presence of cost-push shocks, repeated
liquidity traps and the possibility of being mistakenly considered as an inflation-biased
discretionary central banker when raising inflation.
First, cost-push shocks may help the benevolent central banker to produce inflation,
and so, separating without cost from being conservative, before the liquidity trap (Section
5.1).4 Indeed, this type of shocks leads to different responses under perfect information
depending on the weight of the output gap stabilization objective of the central banker.
To assess their effects, we perform two quantitative experiments suggesting that cost-
push shocks were not sufficiently large to prevent the conservative central banker from
imitating the benevolent one. First, cost-push shock needs to be 16 times larger than
standard estimated sizes of cost-push shocks to trigger separating. Second, even if we
attribute all inflation volatility to cost-push shocks, inflation volatility during the Great
Moderation was not sufficient to trigger such a separating. Therefore, it is unlikely that
cost-push shocks during the Great Moderation5 were sufficient per se to signal the central
banker type before the 2008 crisis.
Second, the repetition of liquidity traps (Section 5.2) may also give incentives for the
conservative central banker to sustain forward guidance and, thus, to limit his willingness
to imitate the benevolent one. As a result, the benevolent central banker does not need
anymore to signal his type prior to liquidity traps and so, to raise inflation. We show that
raising inflation is still needed when traps are insufficiently frequent or, more importantly,
when the central banker anticipates a low probability to experience a second liquidity trap
during his term.
Third, increasing inflation may lead the benevolent to be considered wrongly as an
inflation-biased central banker, thus increasing the cost of signaling. We extend (Section
5.3) our signaling problem to such a case and we show that our main result is robust:
benevolent central bankers need to raise inflation before a trap occurs, even if this implies
4When occurring after the liquidity trap, such shocks reinforce the desirability for the benevolent
central banker to sustain the Ramsey allocation compared to the conservative one.
5The Great Moderation was characterized by low volatility of inflation and weak output gap/inflation
trade-off (Justiniano et al., 2013).
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that they are pooled with the inflation-biased central banker as long as private agents
do not sufficiently believe that the central banker in office is the benevolent one when
observing zero inflation.
Finally, these three elements lead to the following testable implications: the efficiency
of forward guidance (i) increases with the occurrence of cost-push shocks prior to liquidity
traps, (ii) increases with the frequency of repeated liquidity traps or with the length of
the term of the central banker, (iii) but decreases with the past reputation of the central
banker to be inflation-biased.
We get our main results analytically by focusing on the best sustainable allocation
from a timeless perspective (that is when the game starts at −∞) and by assuming that
separating emerges only if the central banker ensures that the other central banker has no
incentive to imitate him at any date. These two assumptions make the problem tractable
and allow us to transform the infinite-horizon game into a simplified three-period game.
We then assess the robustness of our results by relaxing these assumptions. To this
purpose, we study in Section 6.1 the optimal path of inflation when the policymakers
take their decision at a finite time horizon and when signaling can be achieved in one
period for all. In this case, the optimal level of inflation set by the benevolent central
banker to signal his type is initially high and then converges to zero slowly. In the
benchmark calibration, the level of inflation starts at 8% and remains higher than 1.5%
during first four years. Finally, Section 6.2 discusses how to extend our results to the
possibility of contracting with the central banker, where we provide mild conditions under
which contracting cannot avoid the necessity of signaling.
In the end, this paper provides a new motive for raising inflation, not to manage the
probability of falling in a liquidity trap but to signal the central banker’s credibility once
the liquidity trap occurs, so as to ensure the efficiency of forward guidance. In particular,
we show that this motive can result in levels of inflation above 2%. Furthermore, this
paper links weak evidence of forward guidance efficiency with the private uncertainty
about the central banker’s future action. Eventually, we show that the very stable business
cycle during the Great Moderation era was unlikely to give the possibility for private
agents to verify the central banker’s willingness to tolerate an inflationary boom after the
2008 crisis.
Related literature. Raising inflation has been suggested as a possible policy to avoid
liquidity traps (see Blanchard et al., 2010, among others). By widening the size of shocks
required to hit the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, inflation can act as a buffer.
This proposal has also been defended by Ball (2014) and the Fed’s president Rosengren
(April 16, 2015), who argue that the cost of liquidity traps is large, policies used to escape
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the trap are inefficient and the probability of a liquidity trap has increased. Aruoba and
Schorfheide (2013) show that recovery from the Great Recession in the US would have
been a year shorter if the Fed had targeted 4% inflation instead of the observed 2.5%.
Yet, from a normative standpoint, the optimal size of this buffer has been found to be
quantitatively small as liquidity traps are nevertheless rare events (see Coibion et al.,
2012).
An alternative way to enforce promises at the ZLB is Quantitative Easing as studied
by Bhattarai et al. (2015). By making interest rate hikes costly to the central bank, large
purchases of sufficiently long term assets make future deviations from low interest rates
less likely. Our paper’s main difference is that we rely only on reputation concerns to
sustain forward guidance policies, while they consider ex post real costs of reneging on
past promises, that, in the end, hinge on the central bank’s ability to make losses on its
balance sheet (see Sims, 2013, among others).
Bassetto (2015) analyses communication on forward guidance policies. Costly signal-
ing as raising inflation is consistent with his insight that pure communication on credibility
is cheap talk. Yet, in our case, communicating about preferences (the inflation bias), as
it is connected with the credibility, would not affect the set of achievable outcomes for
central bankers: announcing inflation bias, and thus credibility, is also cheap talk in our
case.
Our paper is also connected to the literature on imperfect credibility at the ZLB as in
Bodenstein et al. (2012). The main difference is that imperfect credibility in our frame-
work is an equilibrium outcome that can be altered by a monetary authority’s actions.
In our model, credibility results from reputation concerns as in Barro and Gordon (1983)
or Alesina (1987). In addition, Andrade et al. (2015) provide evidence on heterogeneous
understanding of forward guidance policies and link this to imperfect credibility of the
central bank.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on learning on central bankers’ types as
in Backus and Driffill (1985), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) or Barro (1986) (see also
Sleet and Yeltekin (2007) for a recent contribution). Our paper’s main difference is that
we introduce the possibility of liquidity traps and we allow the credible central banker to
optimally react to mimicking strategies by a discretionary central banker. More generally,
our paper enters in the literature on reputation and asymmetric information as pioneered
by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
Finally, our results contrast with recent results by Nakata and Schmidt (2015) who
argue that delegating monetary policy to a conservative central banker remains optimal
even in presence of liquidity traps. In our paper, we allow for reputation concerns to
sustain forward guidance policy while these authors only consider discretionary policies.
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They thus do not account for a possible link between central banker’s preference and
credibility.
2 Model under perfect information
In this section, we introduce the standard new-Keynesian model in the presence of
a zero lower bound as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Werning (2012). Our
main assumptions concern the process of the natural rate of interest, that may push the
economy at the ZLB to allow for tractability. We relax most of these assumptions once we
quantify the signaling mechanism. Then, we determine in this environment the behavior
of central bankers of different types under full information. This allows us to identify
whether they have similar incentives, when we will consider asymmetric information on
their types in the next sections.
2.1 Model
Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ {−∞, ...∞}. We consider an economy summarized
by two equations:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt, (NKPC)
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt ) . (EE)
where pit denotes (log of) date-t inflation rate, yt the output gap, it the nominal interest
rate and rnt the natural rate of interest. Scalars σ, β and κ are positive constants. Finally,
Et denotes the time-t expectations operator.
The New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) describes the dynamics of prices. The
Euler equation (EE) derives from the consumer’s inter temporal consumption choice.
Finally, the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rate imposes:
it ≥ −i, with i ≥ 0. (ZLB)
Assumption 1 (Process). The natural rate of interest (rnt ) is 0 with probability 1 − γ
and −r otherwise. Once the natural rate of interest equals −r, it returns to 0 next period
and for any subsequent period. We assume that −r is sufficiently low.
This assumption is convenient for deriving analytical results but involves no loss of
generality. We depart from this assumption in the numerical application, where we con-
sider a liquidity trap lasting more than one period. We also discuss the role of possible
future liquidity traps in Section 6.2.
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Welfare We suppose that the date-s economy’s welfare is given by the opposite of the
following quadratic loss function:6
Ls =
1
2
Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
[
pi2t + λ
∗ (yt − y∗)2
]
,
where the scalar y∗ ≥ 0 denotes the desired level of the output gap, also referred to as
the inflation bias, and the scalar λ∗ ≥ 0 denotes the weight of output fluctuations in the
welfare function.
For deriving analytical results, we restrict the policy parameter, λ∗ as follows:
Assumption 2 (Output gap weight). The weight on the output gap in the welfare-
relevant loss function is sufficiently high, i.e. σκ < λ∗.
When this condition is satisfied, the optimal monetary policy under commitment
leads to a forward guidance type of policy similar to Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
characterized by a positive inflation rate and output gap after the liquidity trap. More
about this assumption can be found in Werning (2012). In the numerical applications,
we relax this assumption.
Central bankers We consider a continuum of central bankers indexed by λ, so that
the λ-central banker’s preference is:
Lλs =
1
2
Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
[
pi2t + λ (yt − y∗)2
]
When the preference parameter, λ, is equal to zero we call the central banker the con-
servative central banker. When this parameter is equal to λ∗, we call him the benevolent
central banker as he maximizes the welfare function.
2.2 Optimal policies under full information
Let us first describe the optimal monetary policy and the resulting Ramsey allocation
in this economy. Then we compute optimal policies of a λ-central banker under discretion.
Finally, we derive the policy implemented by central bankers in the presence of reputation
concerns. In all this subsection, we suppose that the central banker’s type, indexed by λ,
is common knowledge.
The Ramsey allocation. The Ramsey allocation maximizes date-s welfare with re-
spect to the entire sequence of nominal interest rate {it}t≥s under the constraint (ZLB),
6A micro-foundation of this loss can be found in Woodford (2003).
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given that the allocation {pit, yt}t≥s solves equations (NKPC) and (EE). Date s is sup-
posed to be in the distant past (s → −∞) to allow for a stationary equilibrium before
the liquidity trap. We call the resulting outcome the Ramsey allocation.
Problem 1 (Ramsey program).
min
it,t≥s
Ls
under the constraints (NKPC), (EE) and (ZLB).
The Lagrangian of this problem can be written as:
Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
[
1
2
(pi2t + λ
∗ (yˆt − y∗)2) + µt(pit − βEtpit+1 − κyˆt)
+ νt(yt − Etyt+1 + 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt )) + ζt(it + i¯)
]
,
where µt, νt and ζt are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints (NKPC),
(EE) and (ZLB). This latter constraint being an inequality, the Lagrange multiplier ζt is
strictly negative if the constraint is slack, zero otherwise. First order conditions lead to:
pit + µt − µt−1 − νt−1
βσ
= 0, (1)
λ∗(yt − y∗)− κµt + νt − 1
β
νt−1 = 0, (2)
1
σ
νt + ζt = 0. (3)
The Ramsey allocation is the solution of the system defined by first-order conditions and
equations (NKPC), (EE) and (ZLB).
Prior to the trap, as the date s is supposed to be in the distant past,7 inflation is
fully stabilized (pit = 0). However, the expectation of a liquidity trap triggers a positive
output gap, −βγ
κ
pil, where pil is the rate of inflation at the ZLB. After the trap, the
Ramsey allocation can be implemented through forward Guidance policy associated with
positive inflation, pil+1, and output gap, yl+1, at the end of the trap. Afterward, both
inflation and output gap converge to 0.
λ-central banker under discretion Under full information and under discretion, the
λ-central banker solves at each period the following optimization program:
7This assumption is sometimes referred to as optimal policy in a timeless perspective, see Woodford
(2003)
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Problem 2 (Under discretion).
∀t,min
it
[
pi2t + λ (yt − y∗)2
]
,
under the constraints (NKPC), (EE) and (ZLB).
The Lagrangian writes:
1/2
[
pi2t + λ (yt − y∗)2
]
+ ...
....+ µt (pit − βEtpit+1 − κyt) + νt
(
yt − Etyt+1 + 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt )
)
+ ζt(it + i¯),
and the resulting first order conditions lead to:
κpit + λ (yt − y∗) = σζt,
where ζt stands for the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (ZLB). As a
result, inflation and the output gap follow:
In any period after the liquidity trap:
pit = λ
κy∗
κ2 + λ(1− β) and yt = λ
(1− β)y∗
κ2 + λ(1− β) ,
During the liquidity trap:
pit = κ
[
λy∗
1 + κ
σ
κ2 + λ(1− β) −
1
σ
(¯i− r)
]
and yt = λy
∗ (1− β) + κσ
κ2 + λ(1− β) −
1
σ
(¯i− r) ,
Before the liquidity trap:
pit = λ
βγpil + κy
∗
κ2 + (1− β(1− γ))λ and yt =
(1− β(1− γ))λy∗ − κβγpil
κ2 + (1− β(1− γ))λ .
In particular, note that inflation before the trap equals 0 whatever the probability of
ZLB (γ) if and only if λ equals zero.8
Sustainable policies. We now investigate whether a λ-type central banker can sustain
the Ramsey allocation under a trigger strategy in the spirit of Chari and Kehoe (1990)
and as in Kurozumi (2008) and Loisel (2008). We focus on revert-to-discretion strategies
8For a given level of γ, there also exists a specific value of y∗ such that pit = 0 as yt = y∗, but
we discard such solution as we concentrate on cases where the discretionary central banker stabilizes
inflation for all values of γ.
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so that the the resulting sustainability condition at date t is:
∞∑
k=t
βt−k
(
pi2k + λ(yk − y∗)2
) ≤ Udt +WD, (4)
where Ud is the current gain from the best deviation given private agents’ expectations
consistent with the Ramsey allocation and WD is the present value of future periods’
losses with discretion. The set of these conditions at all dates is sufficient to ensure
sustainability.Using the results from previous paragraphs, this condition can be rewritten
when the ZLB is not binding as follows:
∞∑
k=t
βt−k
(
pi2k + λ(yt − y∗)2
) ≤ ((κy∗ + βEtpit+1)2
κ2 + λ
)
λ+
β
1− βκ
2λ(y∗)2
λ+ κ2
(κ2 + λ(1− β))2 .
(5)
In particular, in the case of λ = 0, condition (4) boils down to:
∞∑
t
βk−t
(
pi2t
) ≤ 0, for every period t. (6)
As a result, when λ = 0, pit = 0 for any period after the trap. In particular, this holds
whatever the value of the discount factor β.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Full information). When γ > 0, the Ramsey allocation is sustainable
by a λ-central banker, only if λ, the weight on the output gap stabilization objective, is
intermediate, i.e. λ ∈ [λD, λD] where 0 < λD ≤ λD < ∞. In this case, inflation is fully
stabilized before the trap.
In addition, there exists at least one central banker who triggers no inflation before
the trap when λ is lower than λD, that is the conservative central banker (λ = 0).
Proof. See Appendix B.1
Proposition 1 provides several insights. First of all, inflation stabilization before a
trap occurs can be achieved both by credible - with intermediate λ - and conservative
- λ = 0 - central bankers. Second, only the first category of central bankers is able to
sustain the Ramsey allocation and especially forward guidance policy. For low weight
on the output gap stabilization objective, the central banker is not able to sustain this
allocation. In particular, the conservative central banker will never follow through any
kind of forward guidance policies after the liquidity trap as he can achieve full inflation
stabilization afterward.
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The presence of the zero lower bound is key to obtain this disconnection between
inflation stabilization before the trap and ability to sustain forward guidance. In the
absence of ZLB (γ = 0), the Ramsey allocation coincides with the preferred outcome of
the conservative central banker (λ = 0). Yet, such coincidence that motivated Rogoff
(1985)’s delegation result, does not arise anymore when liquidity trap requires forward
guidance policy.
In the end, this means that, even under full information, the central banker in charge
should not only have an inflation stabilization objective but also the objective to stabilize
output.
Remark. Note that the existence of positive values of λ that would ensure sustainability
may be obtained as in standard folk theorems. In contrast, this is not the case when
λ = 0, as there exists no future costs for such a central banker who will always fully
stabilize inflation.
In the end, under perfect information, positive inflation bias (λ > 0) is required to
ensure both optimal policies before and after the trap. In the rest of the paper, we make
the following assumption:
Assumption 3. The benevolent central banker is able to achieve the Ramsey allocation,
i.e. λ∗ ∈ [λD, λD].
This assumption discards situations in which the social welfare does not allow repu-
tation concerns to sustain the Ramsey allocation.
3 Model under imperfect information
We now turn to the equilibrium under imperfect information on central bankers’
types. To this purpose, we first define such an equilibrium before characterizing it. We
then obtain that a central banker that can sustain a forward guidance policy may find
optimal to run positive inflation before the liquidity trap occurs.
In this section and the next one (Section 4), we focus on the case where the central
banker’s types are either benevolent (λ = λ∗) or conservative (λ = 0). We consider
this case as our benchmark case, as we have shown in proposition 1 that these two
types stabilize inflation prior to a liquidity trap but the former can credibly use forward
guidance policy while the latter cannot.
3.1 Beliefs and equilibrium definition.
We denote agents beliefs about the central banker’s type in period t by qt ∈ [0, 1], with
the following meaning: when qt = 1, agents are sure that the central banker is benevolent,
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while, when qt = 0, agents are certain that the central banker is conservative.
In particular, q denotes the agents’ prior beliefs.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is an allocation {pit, yt}t, a sequence of policy decisions
{it}t a sequence of beliefs {qt}t such that, for each period t:
• Given the sequences of beliefs and policy decisions, pit and yt solve (NKPC) and
(EE), where expectations are consistent with beliefs and policy.
• Given sequences of beliefs and allocations, both central bankers optimize their ob-
jective function under the constraint (ZLB).
• Private agents update beliefs on the central banker’s type following the Bayes’ law
whenever possible.
Such a definition of equilibrium allows for trigger strategies and sustainability based
on reputation but also asymmetric information on the central banker’s preference. In the
following, we suppose that economic agents always coordinate on the best sustainable
equilibrium.
3.2 Central banker’s actions and payoffs.
After the trap. To start with, let us note that once the trap ends, the conservative
central banker has no incentive to imitate the benevolent central banker anymore as he
can fully stabilize inflation. This implies that our problem will behave in the long run
as in the full information case. This helps us to simplify the dynamic component of our
signaling game.
Separating before and during the trap. Let us first describe the benevolent central
banker’s policy when separating between types occurs. Such a separating emerges if and
only if the benevolent central banker’s policy implements a policy that prevents the
conservative central banker from imitating his policy prior to the liquidity trap. When
policies are chosen at date t < tl,
9 such a constraint can be written as follows:
∞∑
τ=t
(β(1− γ))τ−t
[
1
2
pi2τ + βγL
0
tl
(S, 1)
]
≥
∞∑
τ=t
(β(1− γ))τ−t βγL0tl(S, 0), (REV)
where we denote by L0tl(S, 0) the loss of the conservative central banker during and after
the trap when he follows his own policy and by L0tl(S, 1) when he replicates the benevolent
central banker’s policy before and during the trap.
9In timeless perspective, t = −∞.
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In general, it is sufficient to satisfy this constraint only in the first period of the
economy, as agents have then learnt the type of the central banker for any subsequent
periods. However, in what follows, we will assume that this constraint has to be satisfied
for all periods date t strictly lower than the first period of the liquidity trap, denoted by
tl. Such an assumption is only made for tractability as it allows to have a constant rate
of inflation prior to the trap. From an economic perspective, imposing such a constraint
may correspond to some form of inattention by private agents, which forces the central
banker to send signals over multiple periods. In Section 6.1, we relax this assumption
and illustrate that signaling inflation is slightly decreasing over time (at a rate β(1− γ))
and is initially higher than the constant rate of signaling inflation that we obtain in this
section.
The resulting problem for the benevolent central banker in a separating equilibrium
is:
Problem 3 (Benevolent central banker’s program under separating equilibrium). Given
the following sequence of beliefs: qt = 1 for all periods,
min
{it}t
L−∞,
under the incentive compatibility constraint (REV) satisfied for all t < tl and constraints
(NKPC), (EE) and (ZLB) at each date.
The following proposition describes the solution of the benevolent central banker’s
problem under separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2. The solution of Problem 3 takes the following form:
(i) for any period t before the trap, inflation is constant (pit = pi) and solves:
pi2 ≥ βγ [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)]
(ii) The net present loss during and after the trap Lλtl(S, 1) is higher than the one obtained
under perfect information.
Furthermore, under Assumption 3, this solution is sustainable by the benevolent cen-
tral banker.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
First, the optimal policy in a separating equilibrium is to set a positive and constant
level of inflation prior to the liquidity trap. This positive level ensures truth-telling of
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the conservative central banker. Second, the benevolent central banker also implements
a less powerful forward guidance policy to deter the conservative central banker from
imitating him. Finally, while this optimal policy differs from the Ramsey allocation in
perfect information, it remains sustainable. The benevolent central banker does not lower
inflation before the trap to ensure the incentive compatibility constraint and after the trap
the incentive to deviate decreases as he implements a weaker forward guidance.
Pooling before and during the trap. We now turn to the description of the benev-
olent central banker’s policy when both central bankers are pooled. It is worth noting
that because the problem before the liquidity trap is stationary, the sequence of beliefs
in pooling verifies: qt = q for periods t before and during the trap, and qt = 1 for periods
after the trap.
Problem 4 (Benevolent central banker’s program under pooling.). Given the sequence
of beliefs qt = q < 1 for t ≤ tl and qt = 1 after the trap,
min
it,t
L−∞,
under the constraints (NKPC), (EE) and (ZLB).
Let us now describe how private beliefs q affect central banks’ outcomes once the
economy is in a liquidity trap. Real functions Ltl(P, q) and L
0
tl
(P, q) denote the losses
of the benevolent and the conservative central bankers once the liquidity trap hits the
economy given private beliefs on the central banker’s type, q.
Proposition 3. The solution to Problem 4 is to implement zero inflation prior to the
liquidity trap, that is ∀t < tl, pit = 0. Furthermore, central bankers’ losses satisfy:
(i) The welfare loss during the liquidity trap Ltl(P, q) is decreasing in q. In addition,
Ltl(P, 1) ≤ Ltl(S, 1), where Ltl(S, 1) denotes the loss in the signaling case.
(ii) The conservative central banker’s loss L0tl(P, q) is decreasing in q.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The more agents are convinced that the central banker is benevolent (q approaching
1), the lower the losses of both central bankers due to the liquidity trap. Indeed, larger
beliefs mean that agents are more convinced that the central banker can commit to
forward guidance policy which is beneficial for both types. Even though conservative
central banker will, ex post, deviate from forward guidance promise, he benefits from the
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private beliefs in forward guidance’s future easing monetary policy. In the end, both
central bankers have an incentive to raise beliefs q.
Note that Proposition 3 remains silent about the sustainability by the benevolent
central banker of the solution to Problem 4. When beliefs are such that q < 1, this may
require the central banker to engage into more monetary stimulus after the end of the
trap, so as to compensate for lack of credibility.10 In turn, this can make the solution
to Problem 4 not sustainable. To keep tractability, we make the following assumption in
the remaining of the section:
Assumption 4. The solution to Problem 4 is sustainable by the benevolent central banker.
Such an assumption works against us as the sustainability of the solution to Problem
4 actually increases the value of being pooled for the benevolent central banker and so
reduces the need for signaling. Yet, it does not affect the incentive constraint of the
conservative central banker, that determines the level of signaling inflation, as it will
become clear in the next paragraph.
Summary. We have successively examined separating and pooling cases. Separating
will be eventually chosen if separating dominates pooling from the benevolent central
banker point of view. Thus, separating emerges if and only if the following two incentive
constraints hold:
pi2 ≥ βγ [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)] (7)
βγ (Ltl(P, q)− Ltl(S, 1)) ≥ pi2 + λ∗[(y − y∗)2 − (yp − y∗)2] (8)
with pi and y are inflation and the output gap chosen by the benevolent central banker
before the trap in case of separating equilibrium. In the pooling equilibrium, inflation
is zero but the output gap yp is positive to compensate deflationary expectations due to
future zero lower bound.
Equation (7) is the incentive constraint for the conservative central banker not to
mimic the benevolent central banker’s policy and who suffers from loss before the trap.
This incentive constraint pins down the price of credibility as it determines the minimum
level of inflation that is required to separate from the conservative central banker. Note
that this equation does not preclude signaling through deflation as the conservative central
banker’s preferences are symmetric.
10See Andrade et al. (2015) for a similar insight on the hump-shaped forward guidance with respect
to private beliefs on credibility.
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Equation (8) captures the incentive constraint for the benevolent central banker not
to be pooled with the conservative central banker and who then enjoys the full gains
from forward guidance, i.e. βγ (Ltl(P, q)− Ltl(S, 1)). This equation then corresponds to
the benevolent central banker’s willingness to pay the cost of credibility, that is signaling
through inflation. In particular, as the benevolent central banker has a preference for
positive output gaps (y∗ > 0), he will always prefer signaling himself through inflation
rather than through deflation.
In the end, the inflation rate before the trap should be sufficiently low not to deter too
much the benevolent central banker’s outcome, but it should be sufficiently high to cause
losses to the conservative central banker to convince him not to mimic the benevolent
central banker’s policy.
3.3 Equilibrium description.
The following theorem describes the equilibrium outcome of the signaling game played
by the two central bankers. In particular, it identifies when agents are able to elicit
information on central bankers’ type, both before and after the trap.
Theorem 4. When the inflation bias y∗ is sufficiently low, there exists q¯ < 1 such that
the equilibrium is as follows:
(i) For any period t after the trap, the equilibrium is separating and agents are certain
about the central banker’s type: qt ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) For any period t before and during the trap:
• If q ≤ q¯, the equilibrium is separating (qt ∈ {0, 1}) and the inflation rate set by
the benevolent central banker is positive before the trap (strictly positive when
q > 0).
• Otherwise, the equilibrium is pooling (qt = q) and the inflation rate equals 0
for both central banker types before the trap.
Proof. See Appendix.
When prior beliefs are too biased towards the conservative central banker (q ≤ q¯),
the cost of imperfect credibility on the effectiveness of the forward guidance is so great
that the benevolent central banker increases inflation before the trap as a costly signaling
device. This results in a separating equilibrium.
When prior beliefs are biased towards the benevolent central banker, such costly
signaling is not desirable any more, as the resulting gains in the trap are lower. This
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results into a pooling equilibrium. At the limit, when economic agents fully believe that
the central banker is benevolent, there is no reason to avoid pooling as pooling does not
limit the efficiency of the forward guidance while the incentive compatibility constraint
(REV) imposes a suboptimal constraint to the optimization program. That explains why
the threshold, q¯ is strictly lower than one.
In either case, agents observe perfectly the type of central banker after the trap, except
in the degenerate case where q = 0, i.e. when the prior belief that the central banker is
benevolent equals 0.
The existence of separating equilibria. The next proposition states necessary con-
ditions to obtain separating equilibrium and determines how the set of such separating
equilibria evolves with respect to the inflation bias.
Proposition 5. q¯ > 0 only if λ∗ > 0. In addition, q¯ is strictly increasing in y∗, when
λ∗ > 0 and increasing with λ∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Proposition 5 clarifies the condition under which the benevolent central banker signals
his type (separating equilibrium). The mechanism is as follows. By raising inflation before
the trap the benevolent central banker incurs a loss due to the quadratic term in inflation
in its loss similar to the conservative type; but he also benefits from lower output loss
because the output gap is closer to the efficient level, y∗. This latter gain is specific to
the benevolent central banker, depends on the weight on output gap stabilization in the
welfare function and explains why he enjoys fewer costs compared to the conservative
type when raising inflation.
Inflation, beliefs and probability of ZLB. To minimize the required inflation rate,
equation (7) holds with equality. This leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 6. Before the trap, the inflation rate in the separating equilibrium, pi, weakly
increases with:
(i) The probability of a liquidity trap γ and there is no inflation when γ = 0. When
q ≤ q¯, pi strictly increases with γ.
(ii) The intensity of the liquidity trap r. When q ≤ q¯, pi strictly increases with r.
Proof. See Appendix.
More likely and more intense liquidity traps imply a higher inflation target, as the
gains for the conservative central banker type from mimicking the benevolent central
banker are higher and the loss for this latter type from pooling is higher.
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Do more likely liquidity traps imply more desirable signaling? How does the
threshold q¯ evolve with respect to the probability of liquidity traps? This is determined
by incentive constraints (8) and (7) and, more specifically, how the term:
[(y − y∗)2 − (yp − y∗)2] = (y − yp)(y + yp − 2y∗)
evolve with respect to γ.
Increasing inflation involves a direct welfare loss but also affects welfare through the
higher level of the output gap. On the other hand, in a separating equilibrium, the
benevolent central bank is better able to smooth inflation and the output gap during the
liquidity trap. In turn, lower expected deflationary pressures reduce monetary accommo-
dation before the trap (that allows to maintain inflation at 0) and, hence, the level of
output is lower. In the end, in a separating equilibrium, the sign of output in comparison
with a pooling one is ambiguous.
We however report the variation of the threshold q¯ with respect to the probability γ,
when this probability is sufficiently small:
Proposition 7. For sufficiently small probability of ZLB γ, q¯ is increasing in γ.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
As a result of this proposition, the level of inflation can even be a discontinuous
function of the probability of ZLB. Let q be above but arbitrarily close to q¯(γ). The
inflation rate is then zero before the trap. A small increase in the probability of hitting
the ZLB of dγ leads q to be below q¯(γ + dγ) and so to a strictly positive inflation rate.
3.4 Time-varying probabilities of ZLB.
Suppose that before a trap occurs, there are two states associated with two different
probabilities of ZLB. For simplicity, we assume that the natural rate of interest is the
same in these two states. The corresponding transition matrix is:
Π1 1− Π1 − γ1 γ1
1− Π2 − γ2 pi2 γ2
0 0 1

with γ1 > γ2, that is the ZLB is more likely in state 1 than in state 2.
Proposition 8. A necessary condition for the equilibrium to be separating is that level
of inflation in state i implemented by the benevolent central banker satisfies the following
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condition:
pi2i = βγi(L
0
tl
(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)). (9)
Proof. See Appendix B.8
Proposition 8 implies that the higher the probability of hitting the ZLB, the higher
the level of signaling inflation. Furthermore, the signaling level of inflation only depends
on the current probability to reach the zero lower bound and, in particular, the signaling
level of inflation (pi1 and pi2) is independent of transition probabilities from state to state
outside the liquidity trap (Π1 and Π2).
To gain intuition from this result, let us recall that, because there is always a possibil-
ity to stay in the same state before reaching the liquidity trap, equation (9) needs to be
satisfied in both states. Conversely, if equation (9) holds for both states, any linear com-
binations of those inequalities are also satisfied ensuring separating equilibrium whatever
the states history.
Remark. Note that under the conditions of Proposition 8, the equilibrium is fully sep-
arating, i.e. separating in all states before the trap and whatever the history of state
realization.
4 How large is signaling inflation?
In this section, we quantitatively assess how great the level of inflation to signal the
central banker’s type to private agents should be.
Definition Parameters Value
Structural parameters
Discount factor β 0.99
Risk aversion σ 1
NKPC slope κ 0.02
Interest rate steady state i¯ 0.01
Liquidity trap parameters
Probability of ZLB γ 0.007
Size of the shock r 0.015
Duration of the trap Ntrap 12
Social welfare parameters
Weight of the output gap λ∗ 0.025
Inflation bias y∗ 0.0625
Table 1 – Baseline calibration
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In Table 1, we report our baseline calibration. Most of structural parameters are
standard and calibrated following Woodford (2003) or Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
We calibrate the frequency of the liquidity trap to a very low level of 0.007% per quarter
as in Coibion et al. (2012). The size and the duration of the trap are consistent with
the estimates of Barsky et al. (2014) for the post world war II US economy. The trap is
hence rare but when occurring severe and relatively long. Finally, concerning the social
welfare parameters, there is no clear consensus in the literature about the weight of the
output gap, so we choose to calibrate this parameter to an intermediate value of 0.025.
Finally, we calibrate the inflation bias, y∗ to 0.0625 consistently with Woodford (2003).
We provide for many alternative calibrations below.
Optimal signaling inflation. Table 2 reports the level of optimal signaling inflation
and the threshold for prior beliefs above which pooling emerges, q¯.
In our baseline specification the inflation level is slightly lower than 2 while the thresh-
old belief, q¯ is around 0.3. This suggests that the inflation level is significantly positive
even if below the often chosen inflation target of 2%. However, signaling is only required
if prior beliefs are very biased toward the conservative central banker. In Appendix A,
Figure 3 displays inflation, the output gap and the nominal interest rate when the econ-
omy is hit by a liquidity trap during 12 periods for different prior beliefs in the baseline
calibration.
Probability of the ZLB is a key determinant of the inflation level. For instance, a
probability of 5% per quarter leads to more than 4% inflation. Equation (7) proves that
the signaling level of inflation is proportional to the root square of the probability of ZLB:
pi ≥
√
βγ
[
L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)
]
,
and, so, the marginal effect of a change in probability when the probability of hitting the
ZLB is close to 0 is large.
Besides, the threshold q¯ below which separating equilibria arises is very sensitive to
both the output gap weight in the central banker’s objective function λ∗ and the inflation
bias y∗. In particular, if one of these two preference parameters are sufficiently large,
then separating equilibrium emerges whatever the beliefs. Conversely, the signaling level
of inflation decreases only modestly with this parameter. This is consistent with the fact
that these parameters determine how much the benevolent central banker’s preferences
are different from the conservative one while they do not enter into the latter one’s
preferences.
Risk aversion is also crucial as it directly affects the effectiveness of forward guidance.
The higher the risk aversion, the lower the inflation, as the gain from forward guidance
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Cases Inflation level, pi threshold beliefs, q¯
baseline 1.5 0.30
Trap spell
Shorter (NTRAP = 8) 0.5 0.10
Longer (NTRAP = 16) 3.4 0.14
Frequency of the ZLB
Less frequent (γ = 0.005) 1.3 0.31
Slightly more frequent (γ = 0.02) 2.5 0.30
More frequent (γ = 0.05) 4.0 0.32
Severity of the ZLB
Less severe (r = 0.04 annualized) 1.0 0.33
More severe (r = 0.08 annualized) 2.0 0.29
Risk aversion
Low risk aversion (σ = 1.5) 0.9 0.21
High risk aversion (σ = 1/2) 3.7 0.16
output gap weight
Small weight (λ∗ = 0.0025) 1.5 0.06
Large weight (λ∗ = 0.05) 1.5 1
Inflation bias
Close to zero (y∗ = 0.00625) 1.5 0.27
Large bias (y∗ = 0.625) 1.5 1
Table 2 – Optimal signaling inflation
is lower. Inflation goes from 0.9% to 3.7% for sigma between 1.5 to 0.5. Given the
uncertainty and the importance of this parameter, the choice of a standard logarithmic
utility function (σ = 1) appears a neutral stance.
Signaling inflation and inflation target. We have assumed that the optimal steady
state level of inflation is zero in the absence of inflation bias. However, there may be
reasons to target a positive level of inflation in the welfare function. The European
Central Bank, for instance, cites three reasons to target a positive rather than a zero
level of inflation: limit the probability of a liquidity trap, take into account possible
positive bias in the measurement of price level changes and a sufficient buffer to avoid
deflation in one country in the euro area due to inflation differentials. These last two
reasons are beyond the scope of this paper. We hence wonder whether our results would
be affected by such a positive price stability definition. To answer this question, we modify
the preferences of central bankers by adding a positive inflation target, p¯i as follows:11
11We do not consider cases in which one of the central bankers targets a positive level and not the
other as this would generate de facto a strong incentives not to imitate the other central banker.
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L˜λt =
1
2
Es
∞∑
t=s
βt−s
[
(pit − p¯i)2 + λ (yt − y∗)2
]
We, then, can rewrite the incentive constraints with a positive inflation target and
compute the threshold q¯ and the level of inflation, pi. Assuming that the inflation target
p¯i is 2% in annual term, we find the same level of threshold, q¯ = 0.3 and a level of inflation
needed to signal the benevolent central banker type around 3.4% in our benchmark cali-
bration. Thus, our main result does not change much when including a positive inflation
target.
It is worth noticing that in this exercise we do not take into account the impact of
the inflation target on the probability of the liquidity trap as the shock is sufficiently
large to always generate a zero lower bound once it hits the economy. However, the
probability of ZLB we consider is consistent with historical data for the US economy that
has experienced positive average inflation.
Discounted Euler equation. The level of signaling inflation depends on the gains of
forward guidance at the zero lower bound. Yet, as argued by Del Negro et al. (2013)
forward guidance may be less effective compared to what is predicted by the model.12 In
the following, we integrate a discounted Euler equation as introduced by McKay et al.
(2015) to account for this lower efficiency:13
yt = αEtyt+1 − ζ
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − rnt ), (10)
where both α and ζ parameters are below 1 and hence reduce both the severity of a
natural rate of interest shock and forward guidance effectiveness.
For comparability reasons, we calibrate all parameters as in the baseline calibration
of McKay et al. (2015). The risk aversion is set to σ = 2, duration of the trap is set to 20,
the size of the shock is −2% in annual term. The discounting parameters are calibrated
as in the benchmark case of McKay et al. (2015): α = 0.97 and ζ = 0.75.
In this case, for a probability of ZLB as in Coibion et al. (2012): inflation is 0.5. This
result is not due to limited effectiveness of forward guidance but rather due to the small
recession and hence the small loss generated by the shock they consider, as well as the
12Note that an intermediate level of q can also explain lack of effect of forward guidance in our model.
See Andrade et al. (2015) for the connection between private beliefs and the so-called forward guidance
puzzle.
13They actually show that incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents can reduce the efficiency of
forward guidance and they then show that the discounted Euler equation is a shortcut to reproduce their
findings in a representative agents formulation.
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limited impact due to the discounted Euler equation and the high risk aversion. Indeed,
in the discretionary case output falls by 5% and inflation by less than 4%.
We thus can consider this calibration as a very conservative one that gives a lower
bound for the signaling inflation level. Even if this level is rather small, it does not mean
that it is always negligible. When the probability of ZLB is high (5% per quarter) and the
severity of the crisis is more in line with estimated values (Barsky et al., 2014), signaling
inflation can become significantly non zero (4% in this particular case). This suggests
that even if the exact level of inflation needed to ensure credibility may change from one
specification to the other, the level of inflation can easily be greater than two when the
liquidity trap becomes more likely and/or more severe.
5 Other sources of signaling and reputations.
In this section, we consider three extensions of our benchmark model that may affect
either benevolent or the conservative central banker’s incentives and hence the need for
signaling. We first introduce cost-push shocks both before and after the liquidity trap.
Our main insight is that cost-push shocks are usually too small to lead to separating per
se. We then study repeated liquidity trap by introducing a probability of hitting the
zero lower bound after the first liquidity trap. We show that if the probability of future
liquidity trap is sufficiently high, separating is achieved by the means of an infinitely small
costly signal. Finally, we introduce a third central banker type to allow the possibility of
being considered wrongly as an inflation-biased discretionary central banker when raising
inflation. We prove that our main result goes through as long as private agents beliefs
are sufficiently biased toward the conservative central banker’s type in case of pooling.
5.1 The role of cost-push shocks.
In this subsection, we investigate to what extent the presence of cost-push shocks,
i.e. shocks leading to an output gap/inflation trade-off, can help the benevolent central
banker to signal his type. Our first insight is that cost-push shocks may reduce the need
of signaling if they occur before the trap, but such a signaling is still required when cost-
push shocks remain sufficiently small. We then show that cost-push shocks are unlikely
to be sufficiently large to replace a costly signal as described in this paper through two
quantitative experiments. Finally, we discuss the role of cost-push shocks after the trap
and we highlight that they give more punishment ability to the private sector and so they
provide relatively more credibility to the benevolent central banker - or more generally
to central bankers having a positive weight on the output gap stabilization objective in
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their preferences - than to the conservative central banker.
We consider cost-push shocks ut affecting the (NKPC) as follows:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt + ut.
Before the trap. As the monetary policy response to cost-push shocks cannot ensure
perfect inflation and output gap stabilization, the corresponding optimal response also
requires credibility. In the end, the optimal response to such shocks, if sufficiently large,
may potentially trigger separation so that signaling through higher inflation compared
with perfect information is no longer necessary.
This leads to the following testable implication of our model:
Claim 1. The more the economy experiences cost-push shocks before a liquidity trap, the
less the benevolent central banker has to costly signal his type and, thus, the more efficient
is forward guidance.
Eventually, the question whether cost-push shocks can be a relevant signaling device
for the benevolent central banker is a quantitative issue.
Experiment 1. We now prove that standard estimated shocks are not sufficient
per se to signal central banker’s type. To do this, we calibrate the size of the cost-push
shocks along the line of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) who estimate a model very similar
to the one considered in this paper and Justiniano et al. (2010) who estimate a more
realistic DSGE model; all other parameters are calibrated as in our benchmark model.
In both cases, we simulate the impact of a one standard deviation cost-push shock to
inflation and compute the loss incurred by the conservative central banker (basically, the
discounted sum of squared inflation) to imitate the Ramsey allocation.
The general specification for the cost-push shocks is an ARMA(1,1) process defined
as follows:
ut − ρput−1 = σp(t − θpt−1),
where parameters ρp, σp and θp are calibrated following estimates by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and Justiniano et al. (2010). We report both calibrations in Table
3. In this table we also compute the discounted inflation loss due to a one-standard
deviation cost-push shock in the Ramsey allocation, which also coincides with the loss
of the conservative if he imitates the benevolent central banker before a liquidity trap.
These losses have to be compared with the gain for the conservative central banker to
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be pooled with the benevolent central banker due to expectations of future forward guid-
ance: 820.10−6.14 Therefore, a one-standard deviation cost-push shock is far from being
sufficient to trigger separating. To trigger such a separating, the cost-push shock has
to be 16 times larger than the estimated standard deviation at least. Eventually, cost-
push shocks are unlikely to be quantitatively sufficient to generate separating and raising
inflation seems to remain optimal even if cost-push shocks hit the economy.
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) Justiniano et al. (2010)
Calibration
ρp 0.85 0.94
θp 0 0.77
σp 0.32 0.56
Loss generated by a 1-standard deviation cost-push shock
17.10−6 7.9.10−6
Size of the cost-push shock needed to get separating (in std)
16 24
Table 3 – Size of cost-push shocks and signaling
Experiment 2. We now run a second experiment attributing any inflation depar-
ture from its average to cost-push shocks. While this historical decomposition may appear
far-fetched, it provides an upper bound on non-costly signaling due to cost-push shocks.
In addition, let us assume that private agents infer the type of the central banker from
the past. They can identify a conservative from a benevolent central banker by comput-
ing the weighted sum of past inflation prior to the liquidity trap. Figure 1 plots these
weighted sums expressed as the constant inflation level that would lead to the same loss
for a conservative central banker during the Greenspan’s term (in blue) and during the
Bernanke’s term prior to 2008Q4 (in red) and compare them to the signaling inflation
rate computed in Section 4. These constant inflation levels are computed as follows:
p¯i = 400
√
(1− β(1− γ))
∑
k
[β(1− γ)]kpi2k,
where pik denotes the observed quaterly change in Consumer Price Index for the US and
p¯i is the level of inflation that would lead to the same level of loss in annualized terms.
The vertical line refers to the change of the chairman of the Fed in February 2006.
Compared to the signaling inflation rate from our benchmark scenario, observed
volatility of inflation was not sufficient to generate a clear signal in favor of the benevolent
14This loss is 640.10−6 in a time-0 perspective instead of a timeless perspective.
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Figure 1 – Observed cumulated losses of a conservative central banker from past inflation
fluctuations.
central banker during the Greenspan and Bernanke tenures. Looking backward, private
agents were not able to disentangle between conservative or benevolent central bankers
since a conservative central banker had still sufficient incentives to imitate the benevolent
one.
This implies that our first experiment’s finding does not only result from the low level
of output/inflation trade-off during the great moderation but also from the low level of
inflation volatility itself.
In the end, both experiments prove that because the Great Moderation was a period
of low inflation, low inflation volatility but also of limited inflation/output trade-off (see
Justiniano et al., 2013), additional signaling through higher inflation would have been
required to provide central bankers with full credibility to implement forward guidance
when the economy fell into the liquidity trap during the Great Recession.
After the trap. Cost-push shocks occurring after the trap lead to very different re-
sponses depending on the central banker’s weight on inflation. If the central banker is
conservative, he will perfectly stabilize inflation, no matter the size of the cost-push shock.
Conversely, when the weight on the output gap in the objective function is positive, the
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central banker would like to smooth the effect of the shock over multiple periods. Yet,
such an optimal response requires credibility as it is time-inconsistent: the central banker
has the temptation to re-stabilize inflation once the cost-push shock is over - this is known
as the stabilization bias. As a result, private agents can punish the central banker by not
believing in his promise to smooth inflation over multiple periods.
This possibility for the private sector to punish the benevolent central banker results
in stronger reputation concerns (i.e. higher punishment capacity) and so, relatively more
credibility. In contrast, the conservative central banker does not care about managing
his credibility. Thus, cost-push shocks after the trap mirror the inflation bias in our
benchmark analysis.
5.2 Repeated liquidity traps.
Our benchmark model rules out the possibility of future subsequent liquidity traps.
Such an assumption makes the signaling problem tractable as central bankers are ulti-
mately separated. Yet, traps can still occur with some probabilities in the future. We
show in this subsection that repeated traps may reduce the need of signaling. Yet, when
conservative central bankers can be short-term, our results are unchanged compared to
our benchmark model in the presence of repeated traps.
Let us suppose that the probability of a new liquidity trap after the end of the first
liquidity trap is γ′. We do not necessarily assume that the natural rate of interest shock
is i.i.d. (which would correspond to γ = γ′) to allow for distinguishing between a high
likelihood of a liquidity trap in the short run and the probability of such traps in the long
run.
Sufficiently large discount factors. One may easily obtain some form of a Folk the-
orem: when the probability of future liquidity traps, γ′, is strictly positive and economic
agents are sufficiently patient, i.e. β sufficiently large, the conservative and the benevolent
central bankers can both sustain their optimal policy under commitment under perfect
information. This is how the result by Nakata (2014) can be interpreted.
If both types can sustain their first best policy, that is the one obtain under commit-
ment, there are no more incentives for any central bankers to imitate any other types.
In this case, any infinitely small signal will be sufficient to signal. For example, as the
two policymakers share different objectives, the benevolent central banker should choose
a level of inflation,  > 0, where  is a small positive scalar. There is thus no need for a
(significant) costly signal.
This result does not contradict Corollary 6 and proposition 8 in which we prove that
signaling inflation increases with the probability of the liquidity trap. Indeed, in these
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results we study a variation of the probability of hitting for the first time the liquidity
trap, γ, while in this section we investigate the role of future liquidity trap in the ability
of the conservative central banker to sustain forward guidance through a punishment on
future forward guidance policies.
On the other side of the spectrum, when the probability of subsequent liquidity traps
is 0, we are back to our benchmark case, where the conservative central banker does
not have any incentives to sustain forward guidance. Thus, for intermediary values, one
can expect that the conservative central banker may sustain some, if not entirely, the
inflationary boom so as to better smooth inflation. This leads to the following testable
implication:
Claim 2. The lower the probability of future liquidity traps, the more willing the benevo-
lent central banker will be to signal his type and the greater the signaling inflation will be
and, conversely, in the absence of signaling, the less efficient is forward guidance.
Finite terms. An alternative reason why repeated traps may not lead the conservative
central banker to be able to sustain forward guidance is finite horizons for the central
banker (e.g. because of finite terms). The game would then also be between long-term
central bankers (that maximize infinite-horizon objective functions) against short-term
ones (that maximize finite-horizon objective functions, in the spirit of the literature on
reputation effects in games where long-run players face sequence of short-run opponents
(see the seminal contribution of Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982).
In the end, the benevolent central banker has to signal himself from being a short-term
conservative central banker and not only from being a long-term central banker.
The only elements that we need to show for ensuring that we can extend our reasoning
to this more complex game is that the short-term conservative central banker implements
0 inflation after the trap and that the incentive constraint corresponding to this central
banker is not too different compared with our original game.
The first point is ensured by the standard backward induction argument: as the short-
term central banker is going to implement 0 inflation in the last period of his term, the
same central banker is always going to implement a 0 inflation rate after the trap.
For the second point, we may even showthat the no-imitation constraint is unmodified
in this game. Indeed, in such a situation the constraint writes:
[
1 + β(1− γ) + ...+ βT (1− γ)T ] pi2 ≤ · · · (11)
· · · βγ [1 + β(1− γ) + ...+ βT (1− γ)T ] [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)] , (12)
where L0tl(S, 0) and L
0
tl
(S, 1) have to be adjusted for the case of finite horizon. Such a
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constraint can, in turn, be rewritten as:
pi2 ≤ βγ [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)] , (13)
which is the same constraint as in the case of the infinite horizon term.
In the end, signaling does not deal only with signaling from long-term conservative cen-
tral bankers but also from short-term ones that may find profitable to be taken as benev-
olent in the short-run. This highlights another dimension along which central bankers’
preferences may differ from the society’s welfare.
5.3 Inflation-biased central banker.
Raising inflation to ensure credibility may also be costly as private agents may mistak-
enly believe that the central banker acts under discretion with an inflation bias. In this
subsection, we investigate the incentives of benevolent central banker to raise inflation
when such an inflation can also be taken as a sign of lack of credibility.
To this purpose, we assume that central bankers may also differ with respect to their
discount factor. To simplify our problem, we assume that the discount factor can take
two values: a high one as in the benchmark model, β and a low one equals to 0 for
simplicity. We call this latter type, the inflation-biased central banker. This latter type
cannot sustain the Ramsey equilibrium whatever the weight on output gap stabilization,
λ.
We show that the benevolent central banker can be optimally pooled with the inflation-
biased central banker. In addition, the former’s incentive to be pooled with the inflation-
biased central banker ex ante can be strengthened by his ability to dis-inflate the economy
once the liquidity trap ends.
The model. On top of the two types that we already considered, we now consider that
central bankers’ preferences can also be β = 0 and λ ∈]0,∞).15 We thus now denote by a
bi-dimensional vector the central banker’s type, (β, λ). The prior beliefs that the central
banker is benevolent, (β, λ∗), is denoted by q, the one that he is conservative, (β, 0), by
qcons and there is a probability distribution function g so that the prior belief that central
banker is of type (0, λ) is g(λ). Prior beliefs have to sum to one so, q+qcons+
∫∞
0
g(λ)dλ =
1.
Note that the central banker with a positive λ but with a zero discount factor (β = 0)
cannot act strategically and so, it would be easy for the benevolent central banker to
always separate himself from the inflation-biased central banker, just by creating noise in
15We exclude λ = 0 because it would be redundant with the conservative central banker.
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the ex ante rate of inflation. Yet, such strategy is not robust to positive discount factors
for the inflation-biased central banker and, in order not to lose generality, we impose that
the benevolent central banker adopts a constant rate of inflation before a trap occurs.
5.3.1 Incentive constraints.
Positive inflation prior to the liquidity trap. As long as the benevolent central
banker implements positive inflation, pi, prior to the liquidity trap, there always exists
an inflation-biased central banker leading to the same level of inflation. The benevolent
central banker is hence pooled with a discretionary central banker (0, λ˜):
λ˜ = κ
y∗ − piκ
(pi(1− β(1− γ))− βγpil)
where pil is the level of inflation during the trap.
As a result, before the trap, beliefs over central bankers with no discount factor go to
zero except the one corresponding with λ = λ˜. The equilibrium is never fully separating
but only partially. However, the exact reallocation of beliefs is indeterminate and many
equilibria are compatible with our Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium definition. We thus
parametrize beliefs once such a partial pooling emerges. We denote by q′ and 1− q′ the
beliefs associated with the benevolent and the (0, λ˜)-type central bankers.16
After the trap, by choosing a different level of inflation, the benevolent central banker
can distinguish himself from the (0, λ˜) central banker so that the equilibrium becomes
fully separating as soon as the trap is over.
Zero inflation case. When the benevolent central banker sets a zero inflation rate prior
to the trap, economic agents hence form (indeterminate) beliefs over only two central
banker’s types: either the benevolent type, q′′, or the conservative’s one, 1− q′′. Indeed,
we exclude that an inflation-biased central banker attributes zero weight on the output
gap stabilization objective.
Incentive constraint of the benevolent central banker. We denote by Ltl(0, q
′′)
the present discounted loss of the benevolent central banker at the in the zero inflation
case associated with beliefs over the benevolent type, q′′ and by Ltl(pi, q
′) his loss if the
benevolent central banker is pooled with the (0, λ˜) central banker and when beliefs over
the benevolent type is q′. The benevolent central banker prefers setting a positive inflation
16Because of the Bayes’ law, beliefs satisfy: 1− q ≥ 1− q′ ≥ g(λ˜) and q′ ≥ q.
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level prior to the liquidity trap if the gain in terms of forward guidance, Ltl(0, q
′′) −
Ltl(pi, q
′), compensates the loss due to positive inflation prior to the trap, hence:
βγ (Ltl(0, q
′′)− Ltl(pi, q′)) ≥ pi2 + λ∗[(y(0, q′′)− y∗)2 − (y(pi, q′)− y∗)2], (14)
where y(0, q′′) and y(pi, q′) are the output gap if the benevolent central banker is pooled
with the conservative and the inflation-biased central bankers respectively. A rise in
inflation, pi trigger two effects. First, it increases the loss before the liquidity trap through
higher inflation. Second, it affects expectations at the liquidity trap through a change
in λ˜. This second effect can potentially reduce or enhance the severity of the deflation
during the trap.
Incentive constraint of the conservative central banker. The conservative central
banker imitates the benevolent central banker if the gains from forward guidance domi-
nates the costs of inflation prior to the liquidity trap. Therefore, the relevant incentive
constraint is:
pi2 ≥ βγ (L0tl(pi, q′)− L0tl(0, q′)) . (15)
Contrary to Section 3, the loss of the conservative if mimicking the benevolent central
banker, L0tl(pi, q
′), depends on the inflation level pi chosen by the benevolent central banker.
Indeed, the third central banker type characterized by (0, λ˜) depends on the inflation level
pi and he matters for the efficiency of the forward guidance. For instance, if pi is low,
the benevolent central banker will be pooled with a low λ˜ type producing low level of
inflation after the liquidity trap making the liquidity trap more costly, on the contrary
high level of pi and hence high level of λ˜ will reduce the cost of the trap. In other words,
L0tl(pi, q
′) is decreasing with pi for a given q′. Finally, if economic agents do not consider
inflation-biased central banker in their beliefs, q′ = 1, then inequalities (15) and (7) are
identical.
5.3.2 Equilibrium description
Proposition 9. The equilibrium is as follows
(i) For any period t after the trap, the equilibrium is separating and agents are certain
about the central banker’s type.
(ii) For any period t before and during the trap:
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• If q′′ ≤ q˜, the equilibrium is partially separating: the benevolent central banker
is pooled with the (0, λ˜) central banker but separated from the conservative
one. The inflation rate set by the benevolent central banker is positive before
the trap.
• Otherwise, the benevolent central banker is pooled with the conservative central
banker and the inflation rate equals 0 before the trap.
The introduction of central bankers with zero discount factor does not qualitatively
modify results from Theorem 4. The benevolent central banker desires not to be mis-
takenly considered as conservative if prior beliefs are strongly biased toward this former
type (in case of pooling). In this case, once again inflation acts as a costly signal for the
benevolent central banker.
Our findings lead to the following testable implication:
Claim 3. The more the central banker has the past reputation to be inflation-biased (the
larger is q′), the lower the gains to be separated from the conservative ones and so, the
lower the efficiency of forward guidance.
Connection with Coibion et al. (2012). In some equilibria, learning due to signaling
leads to a degenerate distribution peaked on the inflation-biased central banker, i.e. q′ =
0. In this case, signaling is impotent to reveal the credibility to agents that attribute
inflation only to inflation bias. In the end, ex ante, such a situation corresponds to the
optimal inflation target when the central banker acts under discretion as in Coibion et al.
(2012). They show that the buffer stock effect of higher inflation rate already explain an
inflation target of at least 1.5% in their benchmark case.
Inflation-biased central bankers with non-zero discount factor. A positive dis-
count factor of inflation-biased central bankers might reduce the ex ante incentive of the
benevolent central banker to be pooled with them. Indeed the ex-post cost of disinflation
policy is higher because inflation-biased central bankers will choose to strategically mimic
the benevolent central banker’s policy after the trap. Finally, the disinflation will require
higher real rates leading to larger fall of the output gap. However, in the long run, as
long as β is sufficiently low, separating will emerge.17
17Otherwise, it means that the discount factor is sufficiently large to make the Ramsey allocation sus-
tainable and inflation-biased central banker does not differ from the benevolent central banker anymore.
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6 Extensions and robustness
In this section, we extend and discuss our model along two dimensions to check for
robustness. First, we determine the optimal policy of the benevolent central banker when
he starts being in office at a finite date. This allows us to study the optimal time-varying
signaling inflation in a more realistic setup. Second, we discuss possible contracting with
the central banker to avoid costly signaling.
6.1 Time-varying signaling inflation.
In this subsection, we extend our results to the case where the game begins at a
finite date and where the central banker is not forced to signal at each date before the
trap. Indeed, in Section 3, we assume that under separating, the benevolent central
banker makes sure the incentive constraint (REV) is satisfied at any date prior to the
liquidity trap. This allows to have a static game prior to the liquidity trap and hence a
constant level of signaling inflation. To study the optimal dynamics of inflation leading
to separation, we relax the following assumptions: first, the signaling game starts at date
0 instead of date s → −∞; second, the incentive constraint (REV) needs to be satisfied
only at date 0. Our main finding is that signaling occurs with a large peak of inflation
at date 0 and persistent inflation afterward (more persistent than the date 0 optimal
solution under perfect information).
The resulting problem for the benevolent central banker that separates from the con-
servative one is:
Problem 5. Given the sequence of beliefs: qt = 1 for all periods,
min
{it}t≥0
L0,
under the time-0 incentive compatibility constraint (REV) and constraints (NKPC), (EE)
and (ZLB) at each date t ≥ 0.
The first order conditions until a trap occurs are the following:
pit + µt − µt−1 − pit (β(1− γ))t η = 0, (16)
λ∗(yt − y∗)− κµt = 0. (17)
where η is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (REV) satisfied at t = 0 and the initial
Lagrange multiplier µ−1 = 0. Inspecting these equations suggests that the signaling
motive (which affects these equations through the term pit (β(1− γ))t η) has a decreasing
effect that converges to 0 when time t goes to infinity.
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Figure 2 plots the dynamics of inflation under separation (thin black line). We contrast
its evolution with the benchmark case in which inflation is constant prior to the liquidity
trap (dashed line) and with the date-0 optimal monetary policy in full information (red
thick line).
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Figure 2 – Inflation dynamics under separation
Our main observation is that signaling occurs with a peak of inflation at the initial
date of the policy decision (date 0) and then leads to a persistent rate of inflation. More
specifically, with our benchmark calibration, the initial level of signaling inflation is 8% (in
annual term) while it is only 5% under perfect information. Inflation decreases afterward
but remains above 1.5% - the baseline level of signaling inflation - for 4 years.
In the end, signaling through a inflation peak is optimal from a date-0 point of view.
The main reason is that this allows inflation to converge to 0 in the long run as in the
perfect information case, thus reducing the welfare cost of signaling. At the same time,
inflation should initially be higher to ensure a sufficiently large cost of imitation for the
conservative central banker, thus explaining the large rate of inflation at the initial peak.
Importantly, the signaling strategy through peak relies on the assumption that one
period of revelation is sufficient to ensure that types will be perfectly identified in any
future period and, in particular, in the very long run.
6.2 Contracting with the central banker
The main problem associated with the implementation of the Ramsey allocation is the
alignment of the central banker’s preferences with welfare. And so, rather than relying on
inefficient policies such as signaling through inflation, one can argue that private agents
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can also contract on the central banker’s compensation to provide credibility. Such a
performance contract has been shown to implement the second best policy in the absence
of liquidity traps (see Walsh, 1995; Svensson, 1997).
To start with, note that if the state-space of contracts is sufficiently rich and if agents
can commit to contracts, then the Ramsey allocation can be implemented whatever the
preferences of the central banker. In particular, the society can write a contract with the
central banker to reveal his type and that can also implement forward guidance once the
trap is over. For example, a contingent transfer that gives an infinite amount of money
to the central banker as long as he follows the Ramsey policy can implement the Ramsey
allocation whatever the initial preference of the central banker. However, as forward
guidance requires history dependence, this contract is also history dependent.
If we restrict the set of contracts to more plausible history independent contracts, then
a transfer that would give the proper inflation bias to the conservative central banker can
restore his credibility. However this type of transfer does not work in two important cases.
First, if the conservative central banker’s discount rate is sufficiently low, giving an
inflation bias to him will not increase his credibility but rather translates into higher
inflation both before and after the trap. Thus, this transfer does not implement the
Ramsey allocation and may be inefficient.
Second, if the responsiveness of the central banker to transfers is private information,
the exact level of transfer needed to restore credibility is unknown. More precisely, let
suppose that the central banker’s preference is of the form:
Γpi2t ,
where Γ is private information (it does not appear in any of the policy implemented by the
conservative central banker). As a result, when augmented with a transfer that creates
an inflation bias, these preferences are:
Γpi2t + λ
∗(y − y∗)2.
Prior to the liquidity trap and under timeless perspective, observing the nominal inter-
est rate will not be sufficient to pin down the exact weight on output λ∗/Γ and hence
credibility is not guaranteed.
7 Conclusion.
This paper argues that raising inflation is a way to solve an asymmetric information
problem concerning the central banker’s motive to stabilize inflation: a central banker
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that stabilizes inflation because of his credibility has an incentive to distinguish himself
from a conservative central banker acting under discretion. Indeed, this latter type does
not follow through forward guidance policy once the shocks leading to the liquidity trap
is over and hence being pooled with this central banker type reduces the efficiency of
forward guidance policy. Our main result is that signaling can be achieved solely by
raising inflation. Quantitatively, we show that the benevolent central banker should
optimally raise the inflation rate above standard inflation targets followed by central
banks around the world especially if the probability, the length or the severity of the
liquidity trap is high.
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A The effect of belief on credibility - For Online Pub-
lication.
Figure 3 plots inflation, the output gap and the nominal interest rate when a 12-period liquidity trap
hits the economy in period 1. Thin, thick, dashed and thick with crosses denote the dynamics of the
economy under the benevolent central banker if the prior beliefs on the credibility of the central banker,
q, are respectively 1, 0.5, 0.05 and 0.
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Figure 3 – Liquidity trap and prior beliefs
When q = 1, the dynamics of the economy is not affected by imperfect information and the efficiency
of the forward guidance is maximal. Inflation is close to 0 and the boom needed after the liquidity trap
is relatively small. The forward guidance lasts 5 periods. In the contrary, when private agents believe
that the central banker is the conservative one, the forward guidance is useless and the dynamics is the
discretionary one. The recession is deep and long lasting. For intermediate cases, the forward guidance
is longer than in the credibility case (q = 1) leading to a large boom after the trap ended. The efficiency
of the forward guidance is quite effective except when beliefs are very biased toward the conservative
central banker. At the limit, when q is very close to 0, the cost of the forward guidance after the trap
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dominates the gain during the trap and the duration of the forward guidance diminishes down to 0.
B Proofs - For Online Publication
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Given the Ramsey allocation, we can observe that inequality (5) is neither satisfied for λ = 0 nor
for λ = ∞. In the former case positive inflation after the liquidity trap is impossible to sustain. In the
latter case, asymptotic zero inflation and zero output gap after the liquidity trap leads to an infinite loss
on the left-hand-side of inequality 5, while the best deviation leads to finite loss (right hand side).
As a result, the set of λ for which inequality (5) holds is bounded. In addition, as inequality (5)
is a weak inequality, this set is closed and so it is a compact, if non-empty, or it is the empty set. In
the former case, there exists a lower bound of this set that we denote by λD. Then, for any λ < λD,
inequality (5) is not satisfied. Symmetrically, we can define λD as the supremum of λ values satisfying
inequality (5).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Solution to problem 5. The first order conditions until a trap occurs are:
pit + µt − µt−1 − pit
t∑
τ=s
βt−τ (1− γ)t−τητ = 0, (18)
λ∗(yt − y∗)− κµt = 0. (19)
where ητ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revelation constraint (REV) at date τ . We
crucially assume that the optimization takes place at t = −∞. Assuming that Lagrange multipliers µt
and ηt converge prior to the liquidity trap toward µ and η respectively, the stationary solution must
solve:
pi
(
1− 1
1− β(1− γ)η
)
= 0, (20)
λ∗(y − y∗)− κµ = 0. (21)
As a result, (1− β(1− γ)) = η. This also implies that pit before the trap is constant and determined by
(REV), that can be rewritten as follows:
pi2 ≥ βγ [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)]
where the index tl means that the loss is computed during the trap.
During the trap the system of first order conditions is:
pit + µt − µt−1 − νt−1
βσ
− pit
tl∑
τ=−∞
βt−τ (1− γ)tl−τγητ = 0, (22)
λ∗(yt − y∗)− κµt + νt − 1
β
νt−1 = 0, (23)
1
σ
νt + ζt = 0. (24)
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Substituting η by its value yields:
pit
(
1− βt−tl−1γ)+ µt − µt−1 − νt−1
βσ
= 0, (25)
λ∗(yt − y∗)− κµt + νt − 1
β
νt−1 = 0, (26)
1
σ
νt + ζt = 0. (27)
After the trap, the system of first order conditions is as under perfect information:
pit + µt − µt−1 − νt−1
βσ
= 0, (28)
λ∗(yt − y∗)− κµt + νt − 1
β
νt−1 = 0, (29)
1
σ
νt + ζt = 0. (30)
Sustainability. After the liquidity trap, the central banker type is unrevealed. Therefore, Proposi-
tion 1 applies and according to assumption 3, the benevolent central banker will not choose to deviate.
In numerical applications, we check that this assumption is well satisfied.
If the inflation level set by the benevolent central banker is below the steady state level of inflation un-
der discretion, then the benevolent central banker would like to raise the inflation rate further. Compared
to the sustainability constraint for the benevolent central banker in full information, the sustainability
constraint, equation (4) is slacker. The deviation is more costly as inflation expectations are higher due
to the positive inflation level before the trap and the loss under the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is lower
has a higher inflation level leads to lower loss. This would lead to an increase in the deviation loss.
If the signaling inflation level is above the steady state level of inflation under discretion (for instance,
y∗ is close to 0), the benevolent central banker would like to lower the level of inflation but it is impossible
as at the equilibrium, constraint (REV) is binding and hence a lower inflation would lead to pooling.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
We first derive economic dynamics under pooling to prove that inflation is negative at the zero lower
bound and positive just after it. Then, we apply the envelope condition to prove Proposition 3.
Dynamics. For any period before the trap, the ZLB has not hit, and so, ζt = νt = 0. The set of
equations is then:
pit +
λ∗
κ
(yt − yt−1) = 0, (31)
associated with (NKPC) and (EE). In a timeless perspective, this implies that pit = 0 and yt = − κβγpil.
The resulting value for µt is µt = −λ∗κ
(
κ
βγpil + y
∗
)
. We denote by µ˜t the modified Lagrange multiplier
µ˜t = m˜ut +
λ∗
κ y
∗.
Lemma 10. If σκ/λ < 1, for all t > l, pit and yt are strictly positive and pil and yl are strictly negative,
for any q.
Proof. We first show that after the trap and after leaving the ZLB, pit and yt have the same sign and
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converge to 0. Indeed, they solve, jointly with µ˜t the following problem:
pit = βpit+1 + κyt (32)
λ∗yt − κµ˜t = 0 (33)
pit + µ˜t − µ˜t−1 = 0 (34)
This allows to solve for pit and yt given an initial value for µ˜t−1. µ˜t follows a second order linear difference
equation:
βµ˜t+1 − (β + κ
2
λ
+ 1)µ˜t + µ˜t−1 = 0 (35)
whose (bounded) solution is:
µ˜t = Γ3µ˜t−1 (36)
where Γ3 = [
1
2 +
κ2
2βλ+
1
2β ]−
√
[ 12 +
κ2
2βλ +
1
2β ]
2 − 1 ∈ (0, 1). As a consequence, µ˜t monotonically converges
to 0, which implies that pit and yt converge to 0 as well. In addition, either µ˜t is decreasing and positive,
and so are pit and yt, or µ˜t is increasing and negative, and so are pit and yt.
After the trap not at the ZLB, first period:
pit = βpit+1 + κyt (37)
λ∗yt − κµ˜t − σ
β
qζt−1 = 0 (38)
pit + µ˜t − qµ˜t−1 − q ζt−1
β
= 0 (39)
We use the solution of the first equations to substitute pit+1 by something proportional to µ˜t, and we
find pit, yt and µ˜t as functions of ζt−1 and µ˜t−1.
This is the same equations than before except that there is now a constant due to the past Lagrange
multiplier associated with past ZLB. µ˜t follows a second order linear difference equation:
βµ˜t+1 − (β + κ
2
λ
+ 1)µ˜t + qµ˜t−1 = − q
β
(
σκ
λ
− 1)ζt−1 (40)
Thus, the solution should be as follows:
µ˜t = q [Γ2ζt−1 + Γ3µ˜t−1] , (41)
where Γ2 =
β+κ
2
λ +1
β (
σκ
λ − 1). When, σκ/λ < 1 (see Werning (2012)), Γ2 < 1.
In period l, the set of equations is:
pil = βqpil+1 + κyl, (42)
λ∗yl − κµ˜l − σζl = 0, (43)
pil + µ˜l = 0. (44)
Equations (34) and (36) prove that inflation is always positive after the trap (for t > l+ 2) if only if
µl+1 is positive. Then, equation (41) shows that it depends on the value of µ˜l. We now prove that µ˜l is
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positive, i.e. pil is negative.
We combine equation (NKPC) at the ZLB period and equations giving pil+1 and yl with respect to
pil and ζl and we obtain:
18
[
1 +
κ2
λ
+ βq2(1− Γ3)
]
pil =
[
σκ
λ
+
βq2
β
− qΓ2
]
ζl (45)
Assuming that σκλ < 1, and remarking that ζl is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (ZLB) and
hence is negative, we thus obtain that pil < 0. Equation (43) shows that yl is also negative in such a
case.
Losses. The envelope condition of the two loss functions with respect to q leads to:
∂Ltl(P, q)
∂q
= −βµlpil+1 − νl
(
yl+1 +
pil+1
σ
)
,
where l = tl is the period at which the economy is facing the shock. µl = −pil > 0, νl = −σζl > 0.
Variables taken at time l + 1 correspond to the situation if the central banker is benevolent. Thus,
pil+1 > 0 as well as yl+1 > 0. Finally, these derivatives are negative, which yields our result. We can
observe that the loss of the conservative central banker is proportional to the square of pil, thus, inflation
is increasing in q during the liquidity trap. The same computation proves that L0tl(P, q) is decreasing in
q.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.
The benevolent central banker prefers the separating equilibrium over the pooling equilibrium if:
pi2 + λ∗(y − y∗)2 + βγLtl(S, 1)
1− β(1− γ) ≤
pi2p + λ
∗(yp − y∗)2 + βγLtl(P, q)
1− β(1− γ) (46)
where pi and y (resp. pip and yp) are the output gap and inflation in the separating (pooling resp.)
equilibrium before the liquidity trap. One can observe that pip = 0 because it corresponds to the best
policy of the conservative central banker. The (NKPC) leads to y = 1−β(1−γ)κ pi+ yp(q) and yp = −βγκ pil.
This inequality can be rewritten as:
βγ (Ltl(P, q)− Ltl(S, 1)) ≥ pi2 + λ∗[(y − y∗)2 − (yp − y∗)2] (47)
(48)
The conservative central banker prefers imitating the benevolent central banker if equation (REV)
is violated thus the two relevant incentive constraints are:
18We here neglect the impact of the deviation of the Lagrange multiplier before the liquidity trap due
to the expectations of liquidity trap, µl−1. However, its contribution is negligible as long as probability
of the liquidity trap is sufficiently small. In the numerical applications, we however formally take this
past multiplier into account.
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βγ (Ltl(P, q)− Ltl(S, 1)) ≥ pi2 + λ∗[(y − y∗)2 − (yp − y∗)2] (49)
pi2 ≥ βγ [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)] (50)
No liquidity trap. When γ = 0, the two conditions (49) and (50) are equalities when both types
follow their optimal policies, thus, they are indifferent between pooling and separating equilibria. Thus,
the equilibrium is independent of the prior, q.
Liquidity trap. Ex ante output gains due to the anticipation of ZLB dominate the steady state
output inefficiency:
γ (Ltl(P, q)− Ltl(S, 1)) ≥ (1− γ)
[
(1 +
λ∗
κ
(1− β(1− γ))pi2 + 2λ
∗
κ
(1− β(1− γ))pi(yp − y∗)
]
(51)
pi2 ≥ βγ [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)] (52)
Note that, if y∗ sufficiently low, as yp decreases with q, pi2 +λ∗[(y− y∗)2− (yp− y∗)2] increases with
q. This allows to conclude as follows. Either Ltl(0) is such that (51) holds and, then, there exists q˜ such
that, for q ≤ q¯, (51) holds or q¯ = 0. Finally, note that q¯ is strictly below 1 as Ltl(S, 1) > Ltl(P, 1).
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
Suppose that λ∗ = 0. Combining (8) and (7) yields
(Ltl(P, q)− Ltl(S, 1)) ≥
[
L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)
]
,
which implies that q¯ = 0 and there exists no separating equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose that λ∗ > 0. Combining (8) and (7) yields:
βγ
(
L0tl(S, 1)− L0tl(S, 0) + Ltl(P, 0)− Ltl(S, 1)
) ≥ λ∗[(y − y∗)2 − (yp − y∗)2] (53)
When y∗ goes to infinity, this inequality becomes: βγ (Ltl(P, 0)− Ltl(S, 1)) ≥ 0, which is always strictly
satisfied. Finally, note that we also have βγ (Ltl(P, 0)− Ltl(P, 1)) ≥ 0 and, as Ltl(P, q) is decreasing in
q, this implies that q¯ is strictly positive, when y∗ is sufficiently large.
The second part of the proposition results from the fact that the derivative of the right hand term
of (8) with respect to y∗ is negative.
B.6 Proof of Corollary 6.
When q ≤ q¯, the equilibrium is separating, inflation under the benevolent central banker is strictly
positive (except if q = 0) and given by the IC of the conservative central banker (7). Hence, inflation is
increasing with q and reaches its maximum for q = q¯.
pi is determined as follows:
pi2 ≥ βγ [L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)] .
Thus, pi is increasing in γ. As L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1) increases with r, pi increases with r as well.
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B.7 Proof of Proposition 7.
We want to determine the derivative of
[(y − y∗)2 − (yp − y∗)2] = (y − yp)(y + yp − 2y∗).
Using (NKPC), we obtain:
y − yp(q) = 1− β(1− γ)
κ
pi − βγ
κ
(pil(1)− pil(q)) ,
y + yp(q)− 2y∗ = 1− β(1− γ)
κ
pi − βγ
κ
(pil(1) + pil(q))− 2y∗.
When γ is close to 0, the two expressions lead to:
y − yp(q) = 1− β
κ
Aγ1/2 + o(γ1/2),
y + yp(q)− 2y∗ = −2y∗ +A2γ + o(γ),
with A =
(
β
[
L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)
])1/2
. Then:
[(y − y∗)2 − (yp − y∗)2] = −2Ay∗γ1/2 +A2γ + o(γ).
B.8 Proof of Proposition 8.
The incentive constraint for the benevolent central banker writes:
pi21 + λ
∗(y1 − y∗)2 + βγ1Ltl(S, 1)
1− βΠ1 + β(1− γ1 −Π1)
pi22 + λ
∗(y2 − y∗)2 + βγ2Ltl(S, 1)
1− βΠ2 ≥ · · ·
· · · λ
∗(yp − y∗)2 + βγ1Ltl(P, q)
1− βΠ1 + β(1− γ1 −Π1)
λ∗(yp − y∗)2 + βγ2Ltl(P, q)
1− βΠ2
The incentive constraint for the conservative central banker writes:
pi21 + γ1L
0
tl
(S, 1)
1− βΠ1 + β(1− γ1 −Π1)
pi22 + γ2L
0
tl
(S, 1)
1− βΠ2 ≥
βγ1
1− βΠ1L
0
tl
(S, 0) + β(1− γ1 −Π1) βγ2
1− βΠ2L
0
tl
(S, 0)
Similarly:
pi22 + γ2L
0
tl
(S, 1)
1− βΠ2 + β(1− γ2 −Π2)
pi21 + γ1L
0
tl
(S, 1)
1− βΠ1 ≥
βγ2
1− βΠ2L
0
tl
(S, 0) + β(1− γ2 −Π2) βγ1
1− βΠ1L
0
tl
(S, 0)
These two inequalities hold with equality at the optimum. Multiplying the second one by β(1−γ1−
Π1) and subtracting it from the first one, we can then simplify the expression that we find, and divide
it by (1− β2(1− γ2 −Π2)(1− γ1 −Π1)). We then obtain:
pi21 = βγ1(L
0
tl
(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)) and pi22 = βγ2(L0tl(S, 0)− L0tl(S, 1)),
which yields the result.
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